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An Adjustable Module Using Korematsu v. United States
In A Law School Professional Responsibility Course1
Korematsu v. United States,2 is one of the most well-known cases in American legal
history. In addition to what it teaches about the development of legal doctrine and
illustrating one of the darkest moments in the history of the Supreme Court, it can provide
law students important lessons on the duties and responsibilities of lawyers.
In Korematsu, wartime lawyers suppressed, altered, and destroyed material
evidence while seeking to legitimize the government’s actions before the Court. Forty years
later, a team of mostly young lawyers represented Mr. Korematsu in successfully vacating
his conviction based on that misconduct.3 While the rules of professional conduct were
different in 1944 than they are now, Korematsu provides a good case study on the roles and
duties of lawyers, both the best of the profession and those who could have done better;
duties imposed by rule, as well as moral duties; the special roles of government lawyers;
and, in the end, choices students may face as they form their own professional identities.
This module provides materials for using the Japanese American incarceration and
Korematsu v. United States in a law school Professional Responsibility course. It is part of a
series designed for using the Japanese American wartime cases in selected classes within
the law school curriculum. Other modules have been developed to use Korematsu in Civil
Procedure; Constitutional Law; Legal Research, Analysis, and Writing; and law school
orientation/introduction to law. The modules have been prepared to help faculty integrate
issues of social and racial justice into their courses and in recognition of how much
students seek those discussions as they grapple with the law as an institution that has had
a significant role in perpetuating injustice.
This Professional Responsibility module:
This module is designed as a supplement to what you presently teach during your
Professional Responsibility course. It is also designed for you to be able to select which and
how much material you would like to use.
There are two versions of this module. One version embeds both text and wartime
documents into a pdf so that you can see the documents in context. Another version
provides the text in Word format and pdfs separately, which will allow you to more easily
edit the material to meet your needs. It is sometimes difficult to edit with the pdfs
embedded in the text.
This materials are made possible by a grant from the Minami, Tamaki, Yamauchi, Kwok, and Lee Foundation.
You are welcome to use these materials without charge, in whole or in part; however, it would be helpful if
you let Professor Bannai know if you intend to use them.
2 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), conviction vacated, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
The 1944 Supreme Court Korematsu decision will be referred to as Korematsu I.
3 Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (hereinafter Korematsu II).
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If you’d like to discuss the materials, please contact Lorraine Bannai, Director
Emeritus, Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality, Professor Emeritus of
Lawyering Skills, Seattle University School of Law, bannail@seattleu.edu.
Using Korematsu in a Professional Responsibility Course:
Teaching Materials
I. Reading/other materials
A. Required advance reading:
Use or modify the introduction to students provided in Appendix A.
B. Optional additional reading/other material:
1. The 1944 Korematsu case attached as Appendix B
2. Six-minute documentaries (students can be asked to view any of these in
advance or one or more could be shown during class)
•
•
•

Wartime Department of Justice attorney Edward Ennis, who objected
to the suppression of evidence during WWII, but was overruled
Then-California Attorney General Earl Warren, who was one of the
most vocal advocates for the removal of Japanese Americans before
his distinguished career on the Supreme Court
Archival researcher Aiko Herzig-Yoshinaga, a Japanese American
woman who had been incarcerated, who discusses her discovery of
the sole remaining copy of the original, unaltered DeWitt Report

3. The documentary film Alternative Facts: The Lies of Executive Order 9066
tells the story of the suppression of evidence while Korematsu was being argued before the
Supreme Court, the lawyers who sought to fight the cover-up, and the lawyers who
successfully reopened Mr. Korematsu’s case 40 years later. 1 hr. 5 min.
4. Lorraine K. Bannai, Enduring Conviction: Fred Korematsu and His Quest for
Justice (2015). A relatively short book (221 pages without footnotes) about Fred
Korematsu, his wartime case, and the legal team that successfully reopened his case.
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II. Class plan (again, select the material you wish to use based on how much time you
have)4
A. Discuss the wartime Korematsu v. United States decision, including what the
Court decided and why. If you would like students to read the opinion before class, an
edited version is attached as Appendix B.
Most importantly, students should understand that the Korematsu Court
upheld the constitutionality of the wartime removal, deferring to the government that the
removal was required by military necessity. The Court largely relied on the military
judgment of General John L. DeWitt, Commander of the Western Defense, as contained in
his Final Report, including his statement that there was insufficient time to separate those
who might have been disloyal from the loyal.
B. Discuss the misconduct that allowed the reopening of Korematsu in a coram
nobis proceeding in 1982. See the student materials, attached as Appendix A. You can edit
Appendix A to pick and choose which material you’d like to assign to students. In the
discussion with students, focus on the following misconduct:
1. Alteration of General DeWitt’s Final Report. Government lawyers argued,
and the Court agreed, that the removal of Japanese Americans was required because there
was insufficient time to separate those who might have been disloyal from those were
loyal. General DeWitt’s original report stated that lack of time (the need for expediency)
was not the reason for his orders; instead, he stated that, because of traits particular to
citizens of Japanese ancestry, it would be impossible to separate the loyal from the disloyal.
When it was discovered that his report conflicted with the government’s argument before
the Court, War Department officials convinced DeWitt to revise his report, and the original
report was destroyed.
2. Suppression of intelligence reports. At the time the government was
arguing its case before the Supreme Court, it possessed intelligence reports from the Office
of Naval Intelligence, the FBI, and the Federal Communications Commission that refuted
DeWitt’s report. The reports were withheld from the Court.
3. Alteration of footnote. When Justice Department lawyers sought
to advise the Court of the contrary reports through a footnote, the footnote was ordered
revised so the Court did not know of the reports.

You could also bring in a speaker to talk to your class or law school about the Korematsu case, its reopening,
and its present-day relevance. The group Stop Repeating History, which includes members of Mr.
Korematsu’s coram nobis legal team, has provided speakers for numerous law schools, colleges and
universities, bar associations, law firms, private companies, government agencies, museums, libraries, and
civic organizations across the country.
4
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C. Discuss the professional responsibility issues raised by the evidence presented in
the Korematsu coram nobis case. Here are some suggested prompts in the Student
Materials:
Attorneys were involved through every phase of the wartime incarceration and
Mr. Korematsu’s case, and each was confronted with choices: then-Attorney General
Earl Warren was among those who called for the removal of Japanese Americans from
the West Coast; there were government lawyers who chose to withhold evidence from
the Court; there were government lawyers who tried to reveal the truth; and there were
lawyers who represented Mr. Korematsu in reopening his case 40 years later.
•

How do you think the lawyers involved in prosecuting and defending Mr.
Korematsu’s case viewed themselves and their roles? As zealous advocates
whose primary job is to help their clients win? Or officers of the court with an
obligation to justice? Or both?

•

Is or should there be a difference between the duties and obligations of lawyers
who work for the government vs. lawyers who represent private clients?

•

If the same misconduct happened today, would it have violated any of the
present Rules of Professional Conduct?

•

As a lawyer, you may be confronted with making an argument with which, or
representing a client with whom, you personally disagree. How might you
respond to that situation, and what considerations would go into deciding your
response? For example, what if you were Edward Ennis, the Justice Department
lawyer who argued against the government’s position to his superiors, who was
overruled, but who still continued representing the government in Mr.
Korematsu’s case? Would you have done the same?

Teaching Materials - Using Korematsu to Teach Professional Responsibility

4

Appendix A (Student Materials)
Introduction to Korematsu v. United States
Korematsu v. United States,5 is one of the most well-known cases in American legal
history. In addition to what it teaches about the development of legal doctrine and
illustrating one of the darkest moments in the history of the Supreme Court, it provides
important lessons on the duties and responsibilities of lawyers.
Attorneys were involved through every phase of the wartime incarceration and Mr.
Korematsu’s case, and each was confronted with choices: then-California Attorney General,
later Supreme Court Justice, Earl Warren was among those who called for the removal of
Japanese Americans from the West Coast; there were government lawyers who suppressed,
altered, and destroyed material evidence while seeking to justify the removal before the
Supreme Court, there were government lawyers who tried to reveal the truth, and there
were lawyers who represented Mr. Korematsu in reopening his case 40 years later.6
While the rules of professional conduct were different in 1944 than they are now,
Korematsu provides a good case study on the duties of lawyers, both the best of the
profession and those who could have done better; duties imposed by rule, as well as moral
duties; the special roles of government lawyers; and, in the end, choices you may face as
you form your own professional identity.
As you read these materials, consider the following questions:
•

How do you think the lawyers involved in prosecuting and defending Mr.
Korematsu’s case viewed themselves and their roles? As zealous advocates
whose primary job is to help their clients win? Or officers of the court with an
obligation to justice? Or both?

•

Is or should there be a difference between the duties and obligations of lawyers
who work for the government vs. lawyers who represent private clients?

•

If the same misconduct happened today, would it have violated any of the
present Rules of Professional Conduct?

•

As a lawyer, you may be confronted with making an argument with which, or
representing a client with whom, you personally disagree. How might you
respond to that situation, and what considerations would go into deciding your

Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), conviction vacated, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
The 1944 Supreme Court Korematsu decision will be referred to as Korematsu I.
6 Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984)(hereinafter Korematsu II).
5
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response? For example, what if you were Edward Ennis, the Justice Department
lawyer who argued against the government’s position to his superiors, who was
overruled, but who still continued representing the government in Mr.
Korematsu’s case? Would you have done the same?
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After the bombing of Pearl Harbor during World War II, government officials, civic
organizations, the popular press, and members of the public called for the removal of all
persons of Japanese ancestry living on the West Coast. As a result of those calls, President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, pursuant to which General John L.
DeWitt, commander of the Western Defense, issued a series of orders. Under those orders,
persons of Japanese ancestry were first subject to curfew and then an “exclusion order”
(herein also referred to here as the “removal” order) prohibiting them from being on the
West Coast. The orders culminated in their forced removal from their West Coast homes
and the mass incarceration of 120,000 persons of Japanese ancestry in desolate camps in
the inland United States. Two-thirds of those incarcerated were American citizens.

Original WRA caption: A young evacuee of
Japanese ancestry waits with the family baggage
before leaving by bus for an assembly center in
the spring of 1942. Courtesy of the National
Archives and Records Administration.

Original WRA caption: Woodland, Yolo
County, California. Ten cars of evacuees of
Japanese ancestry are now aboard and the
doors are closed. Their Caucasian friends
and the staff of the Wartime Civil Control
Administration stations are watching the
departure from the platform. Evacuees are
leaving their homes and ranches, in a rich
agricultural district, bound for Merced
Assembly Center about 125 miles away.
Photo by Dorothea Lange. Courtesy
National Archives and Records
Administration.
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Original WRA caption: Manzanar Relocation center, Manzanar, California.
Street scene of barrack homes at this War Relocation Authority Center. The
windstorm has subsided and the dust has settled. Photo by Dorothea Lange.
Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration.

Three men were arrested for, and convicted of, violating these orders and appealed
their convictions to the Supreme Court. All three were American citizens. Minoru Yasui was
a 26-year-old attorney in Portland, Oregon. After the curfew was imposed on Japanese
Americans, he walked the streets of Portland with a copy of the order in hand, determined
to challenge its constitutionality. After he asked an officer to arrest him and the officer told
him to go home and not make trouble, Min turned himself in at the local precinct.
Gordon Hirabayashi was a 24-year-old student at the University of Washington
when he defied the military orders as an act of civil disobedience. He was convicted at trial
of violating both the curfew and removal orders.
Fred Korematsu was a 22-year-old welder in Oakland, California, when he refused to
report for removal. He chose instead to remain with his Italian American fiancee in the
place that had always been his home. After his arrest, he was approached by Ernest Besig,
Executive Director of the Northern California ACLU, who asked if Fred would be willing to
bring a test case to challenge the removal orders; Fred agreed.
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Gordon Hirabayashi’s case was the first heard by the Supreme Court; Min Yasui’s
case was decided as a companion case. In December 1943, the Court, in a unanimous
decision, affirmed Mr. Hirabayashi’s conviction for violating the curfew order.7 The Court
reasoned that military authorities could have reasonably concluded that persons of
Japanese ancestry possessed certain racial characteristics that made them subject to
influence from Japan and that there was insufficient time to separate those who might be
disloyal from the loyal. Because the Court upheld Mr. Hirabayashi’s curfew conviction, it
said it did not have to address the constitutionality of his conviction for refusing removal.
A year and a half later, in Korematsu v. United States, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the removal orders.8 At that point, many Japanese Americans had
languished in camp for over 2-1/2 years.
Messrs. Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu, as well as the rest of the Japanese
American community, hoped for a way to challenge these decisions, but there was no
appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court.
Forty years later, in 1982, Professor Peter Irons and archival researcher Aiko
Herzig-Yoshinaga discovered critical evidence that provided a path to reopening the cases.
They found documents in the government’s own archives that showed that it suppressed,
altered, and destroyed material evidence while arguing the Hirabayashi, Yasui, and
Korematsu cases before the Supreme Court.

Excerpts from Eric K. Yamamoto, Lorraine K. Bannai, and Margaret Chon,
Race, Rights, and National Security: Law and the Japanese American
Incarceration 224-57 (3d Ed. 2021)
The Coram Nobis Litigation: Newly Discovered Evidence
In September 1981, Peter Irons, a professor at the University of Massachusetts at
Amherst, while working on a book, made a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request
for the original Department of Justice files in the World War II Hirabayashi, Yasui,
Korematsu, and Endo cases. What followed led to the reopening of those infamous cases.

Lorraine K. Bannai, Enduring Conviction: Fred Korematsu
and His Quest for Justice
137-39 (2015)

After much searching, the files were found—misfiled with records of the Commerce
Department. After learning that the records had been located, Peter headed to D.C. When
he got there, he found that the person responsible for FOIA requests was out sick; her
absence may have been a stroke of good luck. She would normally have reviewed the
7
8

Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), conviction vacated, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987).
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), conviction vacated, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
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records before releasing them, but, because she was out, Peter was able to look at them—
unscreened.
So I sat down. And there were probably four or five cardboard boxes. . . . And
someone had written in marker the case numbers on the boxes. And they were all
tied together with string. And it was perfectly obvious that nobody had ever
opened these boxes since they were initially stored because they were all dusty. .
. . So I decided just to sit down and start going through them. And I picked out
the box that said Korematsu v. United States.

Within minutes after opening the box, Peter realized what he had found - evidence
proving what appeared to be a government cover-up during Fred’s World War II case. One
of the first documents he read was a memo from Justice Department lawyer Edward Ennis
to Solicitor General Fahy, essentially saying, “We are in possession of information that
shows that the War Department’s report on the internment is a lie. And we have an ethical
obligation not to tell a lie to the Supreme Court.” The documents that followed only
supported the conclusion that the government had presented the Court a false record. He
was stunned: “I still remember thinking, ‘Oh, my God. This is amazing.’”
Afraid that someone might come over, ask what he was looking at, and remove the
boxes, he worked all day, finding more incriminating documents and furiously taking
notes. He called Aiko Herzig-Yoshinaga, then chief researcher for the Commission, and
told her that she really needed to see the files. Aiko, a feisty Nisei woman, had spent her
war years incarcerated, first at Manzanar in the Mojave Desert of California and then at
Jerome, Arkansas. She had transferred to Jerome so that her sick father could see his
newborn granddaughter; he died Christmas Day 1943, ten days after their arrival. Decades
later, she started to visit the National Archives in Washington, D.C., to unearth the history
of her imprisonment. “The more I read, the more angry I got. I could clearly see that we
were viewed as sub-human, and how politicized the whole internment process had been. I
became obsessed.” Her husband, Jack Herzig, a former Army counterintelligence officer,
joined her in her quest, and Aiko became a knowledgeable and skilled archival researcher
by the time she started her work with the Commission. Peter and Aiko had met in the
archives on his first day researching his book, and, when they learned of their common
work, they agreed to aid each other and share what they found: Aiko could help Peter with
her vast knowledge of the archives, and Peter could contribute his understanding of the
law. After Peter’s call, Aiko collected the Department of Justice files.
Peter believed the documents he found could help reopen the now-infamous World
War II Supreme Court Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui cases.

1. The Petition
[Legal teams formed to file petitions for writ of error coram nobis on behalf of
Messrs. Korematsu, Yasui, and Hirabayashi to vacate their convictions on the ground of
government fraud. A petition for writ of error coram nobis is a rarely used legal
procedure for challenging a conviction after the sentence has been served. The writ is an
ancient writ of English origin (dating back to the 14th century or thereabouts) that allows
the correction of errors committed before the court. “Coram nobis” means “before us.”]
On January 19, 1983, Fred Korematsu’s legal team filed the following petition in
the Federal District Court for the Northern District of California. . . . Identical petitions
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were filed two weeks later on behalf of Gordon Hirabayashi in Seattle, Washington, and
on behalf of Minoru Yasui in Portland, Oregon.
Excerpts from Korematsu’s petition appear below. The first three pages have
been photographically reproduced. The remaining pages, mainly the summary of the
argument and prayer for relief, are transcribed.
Attached to the petition were 32 exhibits, some of which are reproduced
following the petition. Some are included here; all of them are available online.9

For the full text of the 32 exhibits, see Coram Nobis Litigation Collection, DENSHO DIG. REPOSITORY,
http://ddr.densho.org/ddr-densho-405/.
9
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Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis—Korematsu v. United States
584 F.Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984) Crim. No. 27635-W. 10

10

Coram Nobis Case Collection, supra; PETER IRONS, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE RECORD OF THE JAPA-NESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT
CASES 210-12 (1989) [hereinafter IRONS, JUSTICE DE-LAYED].
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[EDS.: continuation of text:]
A. Relation of This Petition to Those Filed on
Behalf of Gordon Hirabayashi and Minoru Yasui
This is an extraordinary petition in many ways.
First, it seeks to vacate a conviction that led to a historic and
widely cited and debated opinion of the Supreme Court. Second, the
allegations of governmental misconduct made below raise the most
fundamental questions of the ethical and legal obligations of government
officials. Third, the alleged misconduct was committed not only before this
court but also before the United States Supreme Court. Fourth, this petition
is identical to separate petitions being filed on behalf of Gordon
Hirabayashi and Minoru Yasui in the federal district courts in Seattle,
Washington and Portland, Oregon, respectively. Hirabayashi and Yasui were
also convicted in 1942 of violation of Public Law 503 and their convictions
were upheld by the Supreme Court in 1943. * * *
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C. Summary of Acts of Governmental Misconduct Alleged by Petitioners
* * *
Point One: Officials of the War Department altered and destroyed
evidence and withheld knowledge of this evidence from the Department of
Justice and the Supreme Court. In April 1943, General John L. DeWitt, who
headed the Western Defense Command and issued the military orders at issue
in Petitioners’ cases, submitted an official report to the War Department
on the evacuation and incarceration program. Justice Department officials
had requested access to this Final Report for use in the government’s
Supreme Court briefs in Hirabayashi and Yasui. When War Department
officials discovered that the report contained statements contradicting
representations made by the Justice Department to the courts, they altered
these statements. They subsequently concealed records of the report’s
receipt, destroyed records of its preparation, created records that falsely
identified a revised version as the only report, and withheld the original
version from the Justice Department. These acts were committed with
knowledge that the contents of this report were material to the cases
pending before the Supreme Court.
Point Two: Officials of the War Department and the Department of
Justice suppressed evidence relative to the loyalty of Japanese Americans
and to the alleged commission by them of acts of espionage. The government
relied in Petitioners’ cases on purported evidence of widespread disloyalty
among the Japanese Americans and the alleged commission by them of acts of
espionage. Presented to the courts as justification of the curfew and
exclusion orders at issue, these claims were made in the Final Report of
General DeWitt. Responsible officials knew that these claims were false.
Reports of the Office of Naval Intelligence directly refuted DeWitt’s
disloyalty claims, while reports of DeWitt’s own intelligence staff and of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Communications
Commission directly refuted DeWitt’s espionage claims. Although the Final
Report was before the Supreme Court in Petitioners’ cases, these
exculpatory reports were withheld from the Court despite the protest of
government attorneys that such action constituted “suppression of
evidence.”
Point Three:
Government
officials
failed to advise the Supreme
Court of the falsity of the allegations in the Final Report of General
DeWitt. When certain Justice Department attorneys learned of the
exculpatory evidence discussed in Point Two [supra], they attempted to
alert the Supreme Court to its existence and the falsity of the Final
Report of General DeWitt. Their effort took the form of a crucial footnote
in the government’s Korematsu brief to the Court. This footnote explicitly
repudiated DeWitt’s espionage claims and advised the Court of the existence
of countering evidence. Before submission of the brief, War Department
officials intervened with the Solicitor General and urged removal of the
footnote. As a result of this intervention, the Solicitor General halted
printing of the brief and directed that the footnote be revised to the War
Department’s satisfaction. The Korematsu brief accordingly failed to advise
the Court of the falsity of DeWitt’s claims and thus misled the Court.
Point Four: The government’s abuse of the doctrine of judicial
notice and the manipulation of amicus briefs constituted a fraud upon the
courts. Justice Department and War Department officials undertook separate
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but related efforts to present a false and misleading record to the
courts in Petitioners’ cases.
Even before trial of these cases, Justice Department officials decided
to utilize the doctrine of judicial notice in presenting “evidence” that
the “racial characteristics” of Japanese Americans predisposed them to
disloyalty. Despite the rebuff of one trial judge, and knowledge by Justice
Department attorneys that countering
evidence existed, such
tainted
“evidence” was included in the Supreme Court briefs in Petitioners’
cases. In addition, War Department officials made available to the
attorneys general of the West Coast states the Final Report withheld from
the Justice Department, and delegated a military officer to assist in
preparing the amicus briefs submitted by these states to the Supreme Court.
Justice Department attorneys later learned of these acts and concluded they
were unlawful, but failed to report these acts to the Supreme Court.
Point Five: Petitioners are also entitled to relief on the ground
that their convictions are based on governmental orders that violate
current constitutional standards. The acts of misconduct alleged in the
preceding Points provide ample ground for the vacation of Petitioners’
convictions. With Petitioners’ cases before this Court through the instant
petition, the application of current constitutional standards provides an
additional ground for vacation. The racial classification involved in the
military orders at issue is subject to the “strict scrutiny” standard
laid out in subsequent Supreme Court opinions. The government now has the
task of proving that such a racial classification is essential to fulfill
a compelling governmental interest and that no less restrictive alternative
is available. Petitioners argue that application of this standard requires
vacation of their convictions. * * *
Prayer for Relief
Petitioners respectfully submit that it would be impossible to find
any other instance in American history of such a long standing, pervasive
and unlawful governmental scheme designed to mislead and defraud the courts
and the nation. By the misconduct set forth in detail above, the United
States deprived petitioners of their rights to fair judicial proceedings
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Although successful to date, this fundamental and egregious denial of civil
liberties cannot be permitted to stand uncorrected.
Wherefore, petitioner Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu respectfully prays:
1. That judgment of conviction be vacated;
2. That the military orders under which he was convicted be declared
unconstitutional;
3. That his indictment be dismissed;
4. For costs of suit and reasonable attorneys’ fees;
5. For such other relief as may be just and proper.
Dated:

January 19, 1983

Respectfully submitted,
By:
Peter Irons
By:
Dale Minami
Minami, Tomine & Lew
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[EDS.: Other attorneys of record for Fred Korematsu included Dennis W. Hayashi, Donald
K. Tamaki, and Michael J. Wong of the Asian Law Caucus; Robert L. Rusky of Hanson,
Bridgett, Marcus, Vlahos & Stromberg; Peter Irons; Karen N. Kai; Russell Matsumoto of
Maniwa & Matsumoto; Dale Minami and Lorraine K. Bannai of Minami, Tomine & Lew;
Eric K. Yamamoto, formerly of Case, Kay and Lynch, Honolulu, Hawai‘i; and Edward
Chen of Coblentz, Cahen, McCabe & Breyer.]
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2. The Evidence
[The below summarizes the evidence upon which the coram nobis
petitions were based].
b. The Suppressed Version of DeWitt’s Report
[In Hirabayashi and Korematsu, the government argued that the orders were a
military necessity because there was insufficient time to separate the loyal from those who
might be disloyal. General John L. DeWitt, the Commander of the Western Defense,
however, stated in his Final Report that his orders were not based on lack of time; instead,
he said that one could not separate the “sheep from the goats” in the Japanese American
community no matter how much time one had. When War Department lawyers discovered
that DeWitt’s Final Report contradicted the government’s argument before the Supreme
Court, the report was altered, original versions of the report were destroyed, and the altered
version was given to the Supreme Court].
Point 1 of the petition focused on the War Department’s alteration of DeWitt’s
Final Report. In 1981, CWRIC researcher Aiko Herzig-Yoshinaga discovered the last
remaining copy of the original Final Report issued by General John DeWitt. . . . What
follows is a reproduction of the original Report.11 Read these pages as if you were a
historian who realizes that you’ve just found something extraordinarily important but
you are not exactly sure how and why.
The key language of the original report appears at the bottom of the first page of
Chapter II of the unaltered version of DeWitt’s Final Report, just at the underline:
It was impossible to establish the identity of the loyal and the disloyal with
any degree of safety. It was not that there was insufficient time in which to
make such a determination; it was simply a matter of facing the realities that
a positive determination could not be made, that an exact separation of the
“sheep from the goats” was unfeasible.12
***

John L. DeWitt, Headquarters Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Office of the Commanding
General, Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast (1942), Ex. D of the Coram Nobis Petitions.
A digital reproduction of the Final Report is available at Coram Nobis Litigation Collection, DENSHO DIG.
REPOSITORY, http://ddr.densho.org/ddr-densho-405-6/.
12 Id. (emphasis added).
11
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When John McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, received this original Report in April
1943, he immediately recognized the conflict with the Justice Department’s stance of
military exigency. He assigned his assistant, Captain John Hall, to work with DeWitt’s
representative, Col. Karl R. Bendetsen,13 to make changes. Here is an excerpt of Hall’s
memorandum of suggested edits,14 which also features hand-written suggestions by
Herbert Wechsler, then Assistant Attorney General of the War Division.

A military lawyer, Bendetsen was deputy to Provost Marshal General Allen Gullion, the chief law
enforcement officer of the Army.
14 Memorandum from Captain John M. Hall, Assistant Executive Officer to John McCloy, Assistant Secretary
of War, to Herbert Wechsler, Assistant Attorney General of War Division (undated), Ex. G of the Coram Nobis
Petitions (1983), available at Coram Nobis Exhibit G, DENSHO DIG. REPOSITORY, http://ddr.densho.org/ddrdensho-405-9/.
13
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Hall and Wechsler thus edited the original Report to remove the most damning
prose about time not being a factor to instead read:
To complicate the situation, no ready means existed for determining the loyal
and the disloyal with any degree of safety. It was necessary to face the
realities—a positive determination could not be made.

At the War Department’s insistence, the military destroyed all copies of the original
Report (except the one eventually found by Herzig-Yoshinaga in the National Archives),
along with all drafts, notes, and memoranda relating to the original version. The soldier’s
memo indicating that he had complied with the order to burn these documents also
survived. The revised official version was dated June 1943, but was not made public until
January 1944. Justice Department attorneys, who had eagerly awaited the Final Report in
preparation for the 1943 Hirabayashi and Yasui curfew cases, did not receive a copy until
after those cases were already decided.

b. Exculpatory Intelligence Reports
Point 2 of the petition focused on the suppressed exculpatory intelligence reports
from the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), all refuting the threat of espionage
or sabotage by Japanese Americans. The ONI was designated by President Roosevelt as
the lead intelligence service responsible for investigating and assessing the threat
potential of persons of Japanese ancestry on the West Coast, including Japanese
Americans. Lieutenant Commander Kenneth D. Ringle headed the intelligence project.
After more than one year of intensive investigations and study, Ringle authored the
ONI Report on the “Japanese Question.”15 This report concluded that the “entire
Japanese Problem has been magnified out of its true proportions, largely because of the
15 Memorandum

from Lieutenant Commander Kenneth D. Ringle to E.A. Tamm, Chief of Naval Operations
(“Report on the Japanese Question”) (Jan. 26, 1942), Ex. N of the Coram Nobis Petitions (1983), available
at Coram Nobis Exhibit N, DENSHO DIG. REPOSITORY, http://ddr.densho.org/ddr-densho-405-16/; see also
GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT 64-65 (2003).
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p hysical characteristics of the people” and that the potentially disloyal (who were mostly
non-citizens) were fewer than 3,500 in number, most of whom were already in custody
immediately after the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Finally, Ringle’s Report recommended
that any potential disloyalty should be handled on an individual basis not on a mass racial
basis.

The FBI also expressly rejected DeWitt’s assertion in the Final Report that
there was any shore-to-ship signaling on the West Coast. FBI Director J. Edgar
Hoover wrote a memorandum to Attorney General Francis Biddle, stating that
DeWitt's espionage claims could not be substantiated.16

from J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Attorney General
Francis Biddle (Feb. 7, 1944), Ex. W of the Coram Nobis Petitions (1983), available at Coram Nobis Exhibit
W, DENSHO DIG. REPOSITORY, http://ddr.densho.org/ddr-densho-405-25/.
16 Memorandum
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Finally, James Fly, Chairman of the FCC, confirmed the FBI’s findings on the
absence of shore-to-ship signaling, in a memo to the U.S. Attorney General.17 He
Memorandum from James Fly, Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, to Attorney
General Francis Biddle (Apr. 4, 1944), Ex. V of the Coram Nobis Petitions (1983), available at Coram Nobis
Exhibit V, DENSHO DIG. REPOSITORY, http://ddr.densho.org/ddr-densho-405-24/.
17
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reported on the FCC’s investigation of all claims of “illicit signaling,” which the FCC
found to be baseless, and he recited his agency’s continuous communication with the
military on these matters.
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c. The Revised Footnote in the Korematsu Brief
Point 3 of the petition focused on the bowdlerized Korematsu brief footnote.
Attorneys Edward Ennis, head of the Alien Enemy Control Unit in the Justice
Department, and his Assistant Director, John L. Burling, were in charge of drafting
the Korematsu brief to the U.S. Supreme Court. When they learned of the exculpatory
intelligence reports, they believed they were ethically obligated to inform the Court.
They forcefully advanced their arguments to their superiors. Here is the memorandum
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from Ennis to Solicitor General Charles Fahy, urging disclosure of the contrary
intelligence from the Office of Naval Intelligence.18

Memorandum from Edward Ennis, Head of the Dep’t. of Just., Alien Enemy Control Unit, to Solic. Gen.
Charles Fahy (Apr. 30, 1943), Ex. Q of the Coram Nobis Petitions (1983), available at Coram Nobis Exhibit
Q, DENSHO DIG. REPOSITORY, http://ddr.densho.org/ddr-densho-405-19/.
18
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When Ennis and Burling drafted the Korematsu brief, they originally included a
footnote that notified the Court about the intelligence reports that refuted key factual
assertions in DeWitt’s Final Report and asked the Court not to take judicial notice of
those facts. Judicial notice of important facts (adjudicative facts) is only proper if
those facts are indisputable. The Justice Department’s original request was critical.
Unless the Court took judicial notice of the DeWitt Report, the Court could not
consider it as the basis for finding military necessity because the Report had not been
admitted into evidence by the trial court.
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However, upon learning of the planned footnote, Justice Department officials
stopped the printing of the completed brief. Solicitor General Charles Fahy and others
then revised the footnote to obscure its import. Burling’s original draft of the footnote
follows, along with Solicitor General Fahy’s edits—deletions marked by strike-out and
additions marked by brackets.
The Final Report of General DeWitt (which is dated June 5, 1943, but which
was not made public until January 1944) [hereinafter cited as Final Report] is
relied on in this brief for statistics and other details concerning the actual
evacuation and the events that took place subsequent thereto. The recital [in
the Final Report] of the circumstances justifying the evacuation as a matter of
military necessity, however, is in several respects, particularly with reference
to the use of illegal radio transmitters and to shore-to-ship signalling by persons
of Japanese ancestry, in conflict with information in the possession [the views]
of the [this] Department of Justice. In view of the contrariety of the reports on
this matter [W]e[, therefore,] do not ask the Court to take judicial notice of the
recital of those facts contained in the Report.

A memorandum documenting these edits is reproduced below. Fahy’s initial edits
prompted Burling to appeal to Assistant Attorney General Wechsler.19 Burling was also
anxious that the War Department would try to dilute the text even further—which it
eventually did.

Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General J.L. Burling to Assistant Attorney General Herbert
Wechsler (Sept. 11, 1944), Ex. AA of the Coram Nobis Petitions (1983) (quoting from original and revised
footnote), available at Coram Nobis Exhibit AA, DENSHO DIG. REPOSITORY, http://ddr.densho.org/ddrdensho-405-29/.
19
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To counter the War Department’s efforts to gut the original footnote even further,
Edward Ennis continued pressing his case with Wechsler, describing the “willful
historical inaccuracies of the [DeWitt R]eport” in the following memorandum.20

Memorandum from Edward Ennis, Head of the Department of Justice, Alien Enemy Control Unit, to
Herbert Wechsler, Assistant Attorney General of War Division (Sept. 30, 1944) (summarizing concerns over
“willful historical inaccuracies” regarding transmissions and signal-ing), Ex. B of the Coram Nobis Petitions
(1983), available at Coram Nobis Exhibit B, DENSHO DIG. REPOSITORY, http://ddr.densho.org/ddr-densho405-4/; see also PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra, at 87-88.
20
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The interaction among various players within the Department of Justice and the
Department of War was complex. In the end, however, Wechsler decided to neuter the
footnote to obscure its original meaning. Here is a memorandum from A.S. Fisher, who
had succeeded Capt. John Hall as assistant to Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy.
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It documents how the War Department signed off on the text that ultimately appeared
in the Korematsu brief.21

So, in the end, the sanitized Korematsu footnote read:

Memorandum from A.S. Fisher, Assistant Executive Officer, to John McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War
(Oct. 2, 1944), Ex. CC of the Coram Nobis Petitions (1983), available at Coram Nobis Exhibit CC, DENSHO DIG.
REPOSITORY, http://ddr.densho.org/ddr-densho-405-31/.
21
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The Final Report of General DeWitt . . . is relied on in this brief for statistics
and other details concerning the actual evacuation and the events that took
place subsequent thereto. We have specifically recited in this brief the facts
relating to the justification for the evacuation, of which we ask the Court to
take judicial notice, and we rely upon the Fnal [sic] Report only to the extent
that it relates to such facts.22

***
[3. The Solicitor General’s misrepresentation in his oral argument
before the Supreme Court]
The transcript of Solicitor General Charles Fahy’s oral argument before the U.S.
Supreme Court in Korematsu in 1944 reveals misrepresentations in Fahy’s direct encounter
with the Justices. As you read these excerpts from the transcript, recall that Fahy earlier
had been urged by Department of Justice attorney Edward Ennis to disclose the ONI Report
to the Court and note Fahy’s emphatic reliance on the credibility of DeWitt’s Report.
***
During oral argument, Fahy stood behind DeWitt’s altered report.
The Chief Justice: It is argued [by Korematsu’s lawyers] that there was no
basis on which the military judgment could be found?
Mr. Fahy: It must be that, Your Honor, because that is the test. The
final report of General DeWitt was held up to Your Honors yesterday [by
Korematsu’s lawyers] as proving that he himself had no rational basis on which
to make military judgment. However, I do assert that there is not a single line,
a single word, or a single syllable in that report which in any way justifies the
statement that General DeWitt did not believe he had, and did not have, a
sufficient basis, in honesty and good faith, to believe that the measures which
he took were required as a military necessity in protection of the West Coast.23

In response to Chief Justice Stone’s question about the propriety of judicial notice of
facts showing military necessity—in light of the ambiguous altered footnote in the
government’s brief—Solicitor General Fahy responded:
Mr. Fahy: There is nothing in the brief of the Government which is any
different in this respect from the position it has always maintained since the
Hirabayashi case—that not only the military judgment of the general, but the
judgment of the Government of the United States, has always been in

Brief for the United States at 11 n.2, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (No. 22) (emphasis
in original) [hereinafter Korematsu I], reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 289, 299 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975), at 203,
213 n.2.
23 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 6-7, Korematsu I, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (no. 22) (emphasis added); see
also Irons, Fancy Dancing in the Marble Palace, supra.
22
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justification of the measures taken, and no person in any responsible position
has ever taken a contrary position, and the Government does not do so now. 24

Although Fahy argued that “no person in any responsible position has ever taken a contrary
position,” hadn’t Justice Department attorneys Ennis and Burling, along with the FCC,
FBI, and ONI taken contrary positions?
***

[4. Ethics and Justice—War Department Officials and Justice
Department Attorneys]
This cumulative evidence of “deliberate” misrepresentations by government
attorneys at the highest levels led Judge Patel to conclude, when vacating Mr.
Korematsu’s wartime conviction, that the “judicial process is seriously impaired when
the government’s law enforcement officers violate their ethical obligations.”25 What
were those ethical obligations? There are rules that lawyers must follow as part of their
professional oaths; those rules are found in the Rules of Professional Conduct for the
jurisdiction in which the lawyer practices. Below, you will see “model” rules from the
American Bar Association. In addition, there are standards that are not binding as ethical
rules, but that set out best practices (for example, the Criminal Justice Standards for
Prosecutors), and there are conventions that are generally respected and followed, but that
also do not rise to the level of black-letter rules of conduct (for example, the special role of
the Solicitor General). Although we do not seek to set out the specific ethical obligations
that existed during World War II, consider the following.
a. The Role of the Solicitor General
The U.S. Solicitor General represents the United States in arguments before the
U.S. Supreme Court in appeals in which the United States is a party. In that role, the
Solicitor General is given “special credence” and is sometimes called the “tenth Justice”
of the Court. Seth Waxman served as Solicitor General from 1997 through January
2001. Consider his view of the Solicitor General’s special role in representing the
government not only as a party to a case but also as the embodiment of the public.
To the Congress, Solicitors General have long assumed the responsibility, except
in rare instances, of defending the constitutionality of enactments, so long as a
defense can reasonably be made. With respect to the Supreme Court, the Solicitor
General has often been called "the Tenth Justice." But alas, although I get to
participate a lot, I do not get a vote (and in some important cases I could really
use one). No, the Solicitor General's special relationship to the Court is not one of
privilege, but of duty—to respect and honor the principle of stare decisis, to
exercise restraint in invoking the Court's jurisdiction, and to be absolutely

24

See id. at 7 (emphasis added).

25

Korematsu II, 584 F. Supp. at 1420.
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scrupulous in every representation made. As one of my predecessors, Simon
Sobeloff, once described the mission of the office:
The Solicitor General is not a neutral, he is an advocate; but an advocate for
a client whose business is not merely to prevail in the instant case. My client's
chief business is not to achieve victory, but to establish justice. 26

When Solicitor General Fahy stated in oral argument that “no person in any
responsible position has ever taken a contrary position” to the government’s then
proffered justification for the exclusion, did the Solicitor General commit a deliberate
misrepresentation to the Court?
Consider the dual roles of the Solicitor General: to be an advocate, and also to
establish justice. Are those roles consistent, or might they sometimes be in conflict?
In the Hirabayashi coram nobis case, Ninth Circuit Judge Mary Schroeder
commented on how the “special credence” given the Solicitor General imposed on Fahy
a particular duty to inform the Court of the “true basis” for DeWitt’s orders: 27
In asking us to hold that the Supreme Court would have reached the same result
even if the Solicitor General had advised Hirabayashi and the Court of the true
basis for General DeWitt's orders, the government ignores the fact that in 1943 it
was clearly in a better position to know that basis than was the defense. It also
ignores the traditionally special relationship between the Supreme Court and the
Solicitor General which permits the Solicitor General to make broad use of
judicial notice and commands special credence from the Court. 10

b. Acting Solicitor General Katyal’s 2011 Acknowledgment of the 1944
Ethical Breach
President Barack H. Obama appointed Neal Kumar Katyal as the Acting Solicitor
General. One month before his term ended in 2011, Katyal posted a remarkable entry
on the Justice Department’s blog. Katyal acknowledged that Solicitor General Fahy in
essence had acted unethically in both Hirabayashi and Korematsu. He affirmed this
message in a speech at an Asian American and Pacific Islander Heritage Month event in
Washington, D.C. Katyal said that he felt it imperative to acknowledge publicly that
Seth P. Waxman, "Presenting the Case of the United States As It Should Be": The Solicitor General in Historical
Context, Address to the Supreme Ct. His. Soc’y, June 1, 1998, available at https://www.justice.gov/osg/aboutoffice.
27 Hirabayashi II, 828 F.2d 591, 602, n.10 (9th Cir. 1987).
10 Traditionally, the Supreme Court has shown great respect for the views of the Solicitor General—“an
advocate whom the Court can trust.” See Jenkins, The Solicitor General's Winning Ways, 69 A.B.A.J. 734 (1983);
Note, Government Litigation in the Supreme Court: The Roles of the Solicitor General, 78 YALE L.J. 1442 (1969).
Thus, he owes a special obligation to the Court as well as his client. See O'Connor, The Amicus Curiae Role of the
U.S. Solicitor General in Supreme Court Litigation, 66 JUDICATURE 256 (1983); Note, The Solicitor General and
Intragovernmental Conflict, 76 MICH.L.REV. 324 (1977). See also Speech by Rex Lee, Solicitor General of the
United States 1981–85, Ohio State University College of Law (March 19, 1986), Lawyering for the Government:
Politics, Polemics & Principle, reprinted in 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 595 (1986) (discussing multiple roles of Solicitor
General).
26
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Solicitor General Fahy had misled the U.S. Supreme Court and that this likely influenced
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision making.
There are . . . terrific accounts of the roles that Solicitors General have played
throughout history in advancing civil rights. But it is also important to remember
the mistakes. One episode of particular relevance to AAPI Heritage Month is the
Solicitor General’s defense of the forced reolcarion and internment of JapaneseAmerican[s] during World War II. . . .
By the time the cases of Gordon Hirabayashi and Fred Korematsu reached the
Supreme Court, the Solicitor General had learned of a key intelligence report
that undermined the rationale behind the internment. The Ringle Report, from
the Office of Naval Intelligence, found that only a small percentage of Japanese
Americans posed a potential security threat, and that the most dangerous were
already known or in custody. But the Solicitor General did not inform the
Court of the report, despite warnings from Department of Justice attorneys that
failing to alert the Court “might approximate the suppression of evidence.”
Instead, he argued that it was impossible to segregate loyal Japanese Americans
from disloyal ones. Nor did he inform the Court that a key set of allegations
used to justify the internment, that Japanese Americans were using radio
transmitters to communicate with enemy submarines off the West Coast, had
been discredited by the FBI and FCC. And to make matters worse, he relied
on gross generalizations about Japanese Americans, such as that they were
disloyal and motivated by “racial solidarity.”
The Supreme Court upheld Hirabayashi’s and Korematsu’s convictions. And
it took nearly a half-century for courts to overturn these decisions. One court
decision in the 1980s that did so highlighted the role played by the Solicitor
General, emphasizing that the Supreme Court gave “special credence” to the
Solicitor General’s representations. The court thought it unlikely that the
Supreme Court would have ruled the same way had the Solicitor General
exhibited complete candor. Yet those decisions still stand today as a reminder
of the mistakes of that era.
Today, our Office takes this history as an important reminder that the “special
credence” the Solicitor General enjoys before the Supreme Court requires great
responsibility and a duty of absolute candor in our representation to the Court.
Only then can we fulfill our responsibility to defend the United States and its
Constitution, and to protect the rights of all Americans. 28

The Fred T. Korematsu Institute for Civil Rights and Education published a
commentary in response to Katyal’s statements. Karen Korematsu, daughter of Fred
Korematsu, stated, “[W]e are appreciative of Acting Solicitor General Katyal’s
remarkable stand to correct the record. Let this be a constant reminder of how justice

Neal Katyal, Confession of Error: The Solicitor General’s Mistake During the Japanese-American Internment
Cases, JUST. BLOG (May 20, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/confession-error-solicitorgenerals-mistakes-during-japanese-american-internment-cases.
28
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for all can only be achieved if the people responsible for upholding our rights act with
integrity, responsibility, and honesty.”29
c. A Prosecutor’s Heightened Duty of Candor?
Consider whether prosecutors, in general, should also have a heightened duty of
candor, given that they, like the Solicitor General, represent the public against a defendant.
The ABA has issued Criminal Justice Standards for Prosecutors. These standards, while
not intended to give rise to a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, are intended
to identify “best practices” for prosecutors.30 Standard 3-1.4 sets out a prosecutor’s
Heightened Duty of Candor:
(a) In light of the prosecutor’s public responsibilities, broad authority and
discretion, the prosecutor has a heightened duty of candor to the courts and in
fulfilling other professional obligations. * * *
(b) The prosecutor should not make a statement of fact or law, or offer
evidence, that the prosecutor does not reasonably believe to be true, to a court,
lawyer, witness, or third party, except for lawfully authorized investigative
purposes. In addition, while seeking to accommodate legitimate confidentiality,
safety or security concerns, a prosecutor should correct a prosecutor’s
representation of material fact or law that the prosecutor reasonably believes is,
or later learns was, false, and should disclose a material fact or facts when
necessary to avoid assisting a fraudulent or criminal act or to avoid misleading a
judge or factfinder. * * *31

Consider the actions of Justice Department attorneys Edward Ennis and John L.
Burling. Both urged their superiors to inform the Court of the intelligence reports that
contradicted DeWitt’s claims. Burling sought to insert a footnote into the government’s
brief to inform the Court of these reports. If the above ABA Standard had been in effect
during World War II, what were their duties under this ABA standard? Did they fulfill
those duties? What could Ennis and Burling have done after they lost the footnote battle
and heard the Solicitor General’s argument? Should they have resigned from their jobs?
Is it better that they did not resign?
d. The Rules of Professional Conduct
All lawyers are bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct, which vary from
jurisdiction but are generally similar in each jurisdiction. Read the following excerpts from
the American Bar Association Model Rules of the Professional Conduct recalling the
Ling Woo Liu, U.S. Dept. of Justice releases unprecedented admission of error in Japanese-American
incarceration cases; Korematsu and Hirabayashi families, legal teams react, KOREMATSU INST. (May 24, 2011),
http://korematsuinstitute.org/press-room/news-archive/.
30 ABA Crim. Just. Sec., Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function, “Standard 3-1.1(b) The Scope
and Function of These Standards,” AM. BAR ASSN,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/ProsecutionFunctionFourthEdition/ (last
visited May 25, 2020).
31 Id.
29
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allegations of misconduct raised in the coram nobis cases.

Excerpts from the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
AM. BAR ASSN, Text of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct32

PREAMBLE: A LAWYER'S RESPONSIBILITIES
[1] A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an
officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality
of justice. * * *
[8] A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal
system and a public citizen are usually harmonious. Thus, when an opposing party is well
represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the same time
assume that justice is being done. * * *
[9] In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities are encountered.
Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's
responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining
an ethical person while earning a satisfactory living. The Rules of Professional Conduct
often prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts. Within the framework of these Rules,
however, many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be
resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the
basic principles underlying the Rules. These principles include the lawyer's obligation
zealously to protect and pursue a client's legitimate interests, within the bounds of the law,
while maintaining a professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved
in the legal system.
***
RULE 3.3: CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement
of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer; . . . or
(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer’s client,
or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to
know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if
necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the
testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.
***
RULE 3.3 CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL—COMMENT:
Available at
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professiona
l_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_table_of_contents/.
32
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***
Offering Evidence: . . . [5] Paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer refuse to offer
evidence that the lawyer knows to be false, regardless of the client’s wishes. This duty is
premised on the lawyer’s obligation as an officer of the court to prevent the trier of fact
from being misled by false evidence. A lawyer does not violate this Rule if the lawyer
offers the evidence for the purpose of establishing its falsity.

Notes & Questions
1. Think about some of the lawyers’ duties described in the Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility: they act zealously for their clients, yet they are to act as
officers of the court and have responsibility for the quality of justice. What do these terms
mean? Do these duties conflict? And how are conflicts to be resolved?
2. Government advocacy and the public interest. Should government attorneys be
zealous advocates for their client in the same way that criminal defense attorneys advocate
for their private clients? What ethical obligations might U.S. Justice Department attorneys
owe to defendants and the public at large about truth-telling, particularly in cases of
national significance?
3. Ethical exceptions for national security cases? Should the Justice Department
attorneys have been given broad ethical leeway in light of the political importance of
wartime issues? What is the importance of national security issues during peacetime?
4. The broader significance of Acting Solicitor General Katyal’s 2011
acknowledgment of Solicitor General Fahy’s ethical breach in 1944? To what extent does
Katyal’s statement, in Karen Korematsu’s words, serve as a “constant reminder of how
justice for all can only be achieved if the people responsible for upholding our rights act
with integrity, responsibility, and honesty?”
Although Katyal’s statement is unprecedented, a critical eye shows that his
statement only acknowledges Fahy’s passive misrepresentations by not revealing
seemingly critical information. Did Solicitor General Fahy go further by directly and
deliberately making misrepresentations to the Court, in response to Chief Justice
Stone’s questions? The Chief Justice questioned Fahy directly about possibly
contradicting intelligence reports and thus challenged the propriety of using judicial
notice of the facts in the DeWitt Report to create the needed evidentiary basis for the
government’s legal argument. In response, Fahy stated that “no responsible person in
government has ever taken a contrary position.” Did Katyal’s statement address this
seemingly active misrepresentation? Does his explicit focus imply that the omissions
are the full extent of Fahy’s ethical breach?
5. Then and now. What choices should the Justice Department’s attorneys,
including the Solicitor General, have made in 1943-1944?
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6. Now and then. What are the ethical responsibilities of non-attorney government
officials in justifying the constitutionality of a government action? And what are the
responsibilities of government attorneys in preventing unethical conduct by nonattorney officials? Consider Rule 3.4 on “Fairness to opposing party and counsel” in
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
A lawyer shall not: (a) unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence
or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having
potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person
to do any such act.

No exact counterpart to this current rule existed in the ABA Canons in effect at the time of
the original internment litigation. Does Rule 3.4 shed any light on the propriety of the
Justice Department lawyers’ actions at that time? On what they should do in similar
circumstances today?
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If you are interested in learning more about the Korematsu case and its reopening, you
might look at some of the following resources:
•

Six-minute documentaries about wartime Department of Justice attorney Edward
Ennis, then-California Attorney General Earl Warren, and archival researcher Aiko
Herzig-Yoshinaga, and their roles with regard to the wartime incarceration and cases.

•

The award-winning biography of Fred Korematsu by Professor Bannai, Enduring
Conviction.

•

Radiolab Presents: More Perfect - American Pendulum I, Korematsu v. United States,
10/2/2017.
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Appendix B - Optional Student Materials
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner, an American citizen of Japanese descent, was convicted in a federal
district court for remaining in San Leandro, California, a “Military Area,” contrary to
Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the Commanding General of the Western Command, U.S.
Army, which directed that after May 9, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry should be
excluded from that area. No question was raised as to petitioner’s loyalty to the United
States. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, and the importance of the constitutional
question involved caused us to grant certiorari.
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such
restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most
rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such
restrictions; racial antagonism never can.
In the instant case prosecution of the petitioner was begun by information charging
violation of an Act of Congress, of March 21, 1942, which provides that:
* * * whoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any
military area or military zone prescribed, under the authority of an
Executive order of the President, by the Secretary of War, or by any
military commander designated by the Secretary of War, contrary to the
restrictions applicable to any such area or zone or contrary to the order of
the Secretary of War or any such military commander, shall, if it appears
that he knew or should have known of the existence and extent of the
restrictions or order and that his act was in violation thereof, be guilty of
a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be liable to a fine of not to
exceed $5,000 or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, for
each offense.
Exclusion Order No. 34, which the petitioner knowingly and admittedly violated,
was one of a number of military orders and proclamations, all of which were
substantially based upon Executive Order No. 9066. That order, issued after we were at
war with Japan, declared that “the successful prosecution of the war requires every
possible protection against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense material,
national-defense premises, and national-defense utilities. * * *”
One of the series of orders and proclamations, a curfew order, which like the
exclusion order here was promulgated pursuant to Executive Order 9066, subjected all
persons of Japanese ancestry in prescribed West Coast military areas to remain in their
residences from 8 P.M. to 6 A.M. As is the case with the exclusion order here, that prior
curfew order was designed as a “protection against espionage and against sabotage.” In
Hirabayashi v. United States, we sustained a conviction obtained for violation of the
curfew order. The Hirabayashi conviction and this one thus rest on the same 1942
Congressional Act and the same basic executive and military orders, all of which orders
were aimed at the twin dangers of espionage and sabotage. * * *
In the light of the principles we announced in the Hirabayashi case, we are unable to
conclude that it was beyond the war power of Congress and the Executive to exclude
those of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war area at the time they did. True,
exclusion from the area in which one’s home is located is a far greater deprivation than
constant confinement to the home from 8 P.M. to 6 A.M. Nothing short of apprehension
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by the proper military authorities of the gravest imminent danger to the public safety can
constitutionally justify either. But exclusion from a threatened area, no less than curfew,
has a definite and close relationship to the prevention of espionage and sabotage. The
military authorities, charged with the primary responsibility of defending our shores,
concluded that curfew provided inadequate protection and ordered exclusion. They did
so, as pointed out in our Hirabayashi opinion, in accordance with Congressional authority
to the military to say who should, and who should not, remain in the threatened areas.
In this case the petitioner challenges the assumptions upon which we rested our
conclusions in the Hirabayashi case. He also urges that by May 1942, when Order No.
34 was promulgated, all danger of Japanese invasion of the West Coast had disappeared.
After careful consideration of these contentions we are compelled to reject them.
Here, as in the Hirabayashi case, “* * * we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment
of the military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that
population, whose number and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained.”
***
Like curfew, exclusion of those of Japanese origin was deemed necessary because of
the presence of an unascertained number of disloyal members of the group, most of
whom we have no doubt were loyal to this country. It was because we could not reject
the finding of the military authorities that it was impossible to bring about an immediate
segregation of the disloyal from the loyal that we sustained the validity of the curfew
order as applying to the whole group. In the instant case, temporary exclusion of the
entire group was rested by the military on the same ground. The judgment that
exclusion of the whole group was for the same reason a military imperative answers the
contention that the exclusion was in the nature of group punishment based on
antagonism to those of Japanese origin. That there were members of the group who
retained loyalties to Japan has been confirmed by investigations made subsequent to
the exclusion. Approximately five thousand American citizens of Japanese ancestry
refused to swear unqualified allegiance to the United States and to renounce allegiance
to the Japanese Emperor, and several thousand evacuees requested repatriation to
Japan.
We uphold the exclusion order as of the time it was made and when the petitioner
violated it. In doing so, we are not unmindful of the hardships imposed by it upon a
large group of American citizens. But hardships are part of war, and war is an
aggregation of hardships. All citizens alike, both in and out of uniform, feel the impact of
war in greater or lesser measure. Citizenship has its responsibilities as well as its
privileges, and in time of war the burden is always heavier. Compulsory exclusion of
large groups of citizens from their homes, except under circumstances of direst
emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions. But when
under conditions of modern warfare our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the
power to protect must be commensurate with the threatened danger.
***
It is now argued that the validity of the exclusion order cannot be considered apart
from the orders requiring him, after departure from the area, to report and to remain in
an assembly or relocation center. The contention is that we must treat these separate
orders as one and inseparable; that, for this reason, if detention in the assembly or
relocation center would have illegally deprived the petitioner of his liberty, the exclusion
order and his conviction under it cannot stand.
We are thus being asked to pass at this time upon the whole subsequent detention
program in both assembly and relocation centers, although the only issues framed at the
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trial related to petitioner’s remaining in the prohibited area in violation of the exclusion
order. Had petitioner here left the prohibited area and gone to an assembly center we
cannot say either as a matter of fact or law that his presence in that center would have
resulted in his detention in a relocation center. Some who did report to the assembly
center were not sent to relocation centers. * * * This illustrates that they pose different
problems and may be governed by different principles. The lawfulness of one does not
necessarily determine the lawfulness of the others. This is made clear when we analyze the
requirements of the separate provisions of the separate orders. These separate
requirements were that those of Japanese ancestry (1) depart from the area; (2) report
to and temporarily remain in an assembly center; (3) go under military control to a
relocation center there to remain for an indeterminate period until released conditionally
or unconditionally by the military authorities. Each of these requirements, it will be
noted, imposed distinct duties in connection with the separate steps in a complete
evacuation program. Had Congress directly incorporated into one Act the language of
these separate orders, and provided sanctions for their violations, disobedience of any
one would have constituted a separate offense. There is no reason why violations of
these orders, insofar as they were promulgated pursuant to Congressional enactment,
should not be treated as separate offenses. * * *
Since the petitioner has not been convicted of failing to report or to remain in an
assembly or relocation center, we cannot in this case determine the validity of those
separate provisions of the order. It is sufficient here for us to pass upon the order which
petitioner violated. To do more would be to go beyond the issues raised, and to decide
momentous questions not contained within the framework of the pleadings or the
evidence in this case. It will be time enough to decide the serious constitutional issues
which petitioner seeks to raise when an assembly or relocation order is applied or is
certain to be applied to him, and we have its terms before us.
Some of the members of the Court are of the view that evacuation and detention in an
Assembly Center were inseparable. After May 3, 1942, the date of Exclusion Order No. 34,
Korematsu was under compulsion to leave the area not as he would choose but via an
Assembly Center. The Assembly Center was conceived as a part of the machinery for group
evacuation. The power to exclude includes the power to do it by force if necessary. And any
forcible measure must necessarily entail some degree of detention or restraint whatever
method of removal is selected. But whichever view is taken, it results in holding that the
order under which petitioner was convicted was valid.
It is said that we are dealing here with the case of imprisonment of a citizen in a
concentration camp solely because of his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry
concerning his loyalty and good disposition towards the United States. Our task would
be simple, our duty clear, were this a case involving the imprisonment of a loyal citizen
in a concentration camp because of racial prejudice. Regardless of the true nature of the
assembly and relocation centers—and we deem it unjustifiable to call them
concentration camps with all the ugly connotations that term implies—we are dealing
specifically with nothing but an exclusion order. To cast this case into outlines of racial
prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which were presented, merely
confuses the issue.
Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or
his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the
properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt
constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided that the military
urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated
Appendix B - Optional Student Materials - Korematsu v. United States 1944 Supreme Court
case
3

from the West Coast temporarily, and finally, because Congress, reposing its confidence
in this time of war in our military leaders—as inevitably it must—determined that they
should have the power to do just this. There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of
some, the military authorities considered that the need for action was great, and time was
short. We cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight—now say
that at that time these actions were unjustified.
Affirmed.
[Concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter is omitted].
[Mr. Justice ROBERTS dissented on the ground that the Korematsu case was not a
limited intrusion like the curfew order in Hirabayashi. Instead, the government’s orders
involved imprisonment based on race. A brief excerpt follows].
I dissent, because I think the indisputable facts exhibit a clear violation of
Constitutional rights.
This is not a case of keeping people off the streets at night as was Hirabayashi v.
United States, nor a case of temporary exclusion of a citizen from an area for his own
safety or that of the community, nor a case of offering him an opportunity to go
temporarily out of an area where his presence might cause danger to himself or to his
fellows. On the contrary, it is the case of convicting a citizen as a punishment for not
submitting to imprisonment in a concentration camp, based on his ancestry, and solely
because of his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty and good
disposition towards the United States. If this be a correct statement of the facts
disclosed by this record, and facts of which we take judicial notice, I need hardly labor
the conclusion that Constitutional rights have been violated.
The Government’s argument, and the opinion of the court, in my judgment,
erroneously divide that which is single and indivisible and thus make the case appear as
if the petitioner violated a Military Order, sanctioned by Act of Congress, which excluded
him from his home, by refusing voluntarily to leave and, so, knowingly and intentionally,
defying the order and the Act of Congress.
[E DS: Justice ROBERTS addressed how, at the time the exclusion order was issued, Mr.
Korematsu was also subject to a “freeze” order prohibiting him from leaving the area
except as directed by further military].
The obvious purpose of the orders made, taken together, was to drive all citizens of
Japanese ancestry into Assembly Centers within the zones of their residence, under pain
of criminal prosecution. * * *
[T]he * * * the exclusion was but a part of an overall plan for forcible detention.
This case cannot, therefore, be decided on any such narrow ground as the possible
validity of a Temporary Exclusion Order under which the residents of an area are given an
opportunity to leave and go elsewhere in their native land outside the boundaries of a
military area. To make the case turn on any such assumption is to shut our eyes to reality.
* * * I would reverse the judgment of conviction.
Mr. Justice MURPHY, dissenting.
This exclusion of “all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien,” from
the Pacific Coast area on a plea of military necessity in the absence of martial law ought
not to be approved. Such exclusion goes over “the very brink of constitutional power”
and falls into the ugly abyss of racism.
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In dealing with matters relating to the prosecution and progress of a war, we must
accord great respect and consideration to the judgments of the military authorities who
are on the scene and who have full knowledge of the military facts. The scope of their
discretion must, as a matter of necessity and common sense, be wide. And their
judgments ought not to be overruled lightly by those whose training and duties ill-equip
them to deal intelligently with matters so vital to the physical security of the nation.
At the same time, however, it is essential that there be definite limits to military
discretion, especially where martial law has not been declared. Individuals must not be
left impoverished of their constitutional rights on a plea of military necessity that has
neither substance nor support. Thus, like other claims conflicting with the asserted
constitutional rights of the individual, the military claim must subject itself to the judicial
process of having its reasonableness determined and its conflicts with other interests
reconciled. “What are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or not they
have been over-stepped in a particular case, are judicial questions.” Sterling v.
Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 401 [(1932)].
The judicial test of whether the Government, on a plea of military necessity, can
validly deprive an individual of any of his constitutional rights is whether the
deprivation is reasonably related to a public danger that is so “immediate, imminent, and
impending” as not to admit of delay and not to permit the intervention of ordinary
constitutional processes to alleviate the danger. Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34, banishing
from a prescribed area of the Pacific Coast “all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien
and non-alien,” clearly does not meet that test. Being an obvious racial discrimination,
the order deprives all those within its scope of the equal protection of the laws as
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. It further deprives these individuals of their
constitutional rights to live and work where they will, to establish a home where they
choose and to move about freely. In excommunicating them without benefit of hearings,
this order also deprives them of all their constitutional rights to procedural due process.
Yet no reasonable relation to an “immediate, imminent, and impending” public danger is
evident to support this racial restriction which is one of the most sweeping and complete
deprivations of constitutional rights in the history of this nation in the absence of martial
law.
It must be conceded that the military and naval situation in the spring of 1942 was
such as to generate a very real fear of invasion of the Pacific Coast, accompanied by
fears of sabotage and espionage in that area. The military command was therefore
justified in adopting all reasonable means necessary to combat these dangers. In adjudging
the military action taken in light of the then apparent dangers, we must not erect too
high or too meticulous standards; it is necessary only that the action have some
reasonable relation to the removal of the dangers of invasion, sabotage and espionage. But
the exclusion, either temporarily or permanently, of all persons with Japanese blood in
their veins has no such reasonable relation. And that relation is lacking because the
exclusion order necessarily must rely for its reasonableness upon the assumption that all
persons of Japanese ancestry may have a dangerous tendency to commit sabotage and
espionage and to aid our Japanese enemy in other ways. It is difficult to believe that
reason, logic or experience could be marshaled in support of such an assumption.
That this forced exclusion was the result in good measure of this erroneous
assumption of racial guilt rather than bona fide military necessity is evidenced by the
Commanding General’s Final Report on the evacuation from the Pacific Coast area. In it he
refers to all individuals of Japanese descent as “subversive,” as belonging to “an enemy
race” whose “racial strains are undiluted,” and as constituting “over 112,000 potential
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enemies * * * at large today” along the Pacific Coast. In support of this blanket
condemnation of all persons of Japanese descent, however, no reliable evidence is cited
to show that such individuals were generally disloyal, or had generally so conducted
themselves in this area as to constitute a special menace to defense installations or war
industries, or had otherwise by their behavior furnished reasonable ground for their
exclusion as a group.
Justification for the exclusion is sought, instead, mainly upon questionable racial and
sociological grounds not ordinarily within the realm of expert military judgment,
supplemented by certain semi-military conclusions drawn from an unwarranted use of
circumstantial evidence. Individuals of Japanese ancestry are condemned because they
are said to be “a large, unassimilated, tightly knit racial group, bound to an enemy nation
by strong ties of race, culture, custom and religion.”4
They are claimed to be given to “emperor worshipping ceremonies”5 and to “dual
citizenship.”6 Japanese language schools and allegedly pro-Japanese organizations are
cited as evidence of possible group disloyalty,7 together with facts as to certain
persons being educated and residing at length in Japan. It is intimated that many of
these individuals deliberately resided “adjacent to strategic points,” thus enabling them
“to carry into execution a tremendous program of sabotage on a mass scale should any
considerable number of them have been inclined to do so.”9
4

To the extent that assimilation is a problem, it is largely the result of certain social customs and laws of
the American general public. Studies demonstrate that persons of Japanese descent are readily susceptible
to integration in our society if given the opportunity. Strong, The Second-Generation Japanese Problem
(1934); Smith, Americans in Process (1937); Mears, Resident Orientals on the American Pacific Coast
(1928); Millis, The Japanese Problem in the United States (1942). The failure to accomplish an ideal status
of assimilation, therefore, cannot be charged to the refusal of these persons to become Americanized or to
their loyalty to Japan. And the retention by some persons of certain customs and religious practices of
their ancestors is no criterion of their loyalty to the United States.
5

Final Report, pp. 10-11. No sinister correlation between the emperor worshipping activities and
disloyalty to America was shown.
6

Final Report, p. 22. The charge of “dual citizenship” springs from a misunderstanding of the simple fact
that Japan in the past used the doctrine of jus sanguinis, as she had a right to do under international law,
and claimed as her citizens all persons born of Japanese nationals wherever located. Japan has greatly
modified this doctrine, however, by allowing all Japanese born in the United States to renounce any claim
of dual citizenship and by releasing her claim as to all born in the United States after 1925. See Freeman,
Genesis, Exodus, and Leviticus: Genealogy, Evacuation, and Law, 28 Cornell L.Q. 414, 447-8, and authorities
there cited; McWilliams, Prejudice, 123-4 (1944).
7

Final Report, pp. 12-13. We have had various foreign language schools in this country for generations
without considering their existence as ground for racial discrimination. No subversive activities or
teachings have been shown in connection with the Japanese schools. McWilliams, Prejudice, 121-3 (1944).
9

Final Report, p. 10; see also pp. vii, 9, 15-17. This insinuation, based purely upon speculation and
circumstantial evidence, completely overlooks the fact that the main geographic pattern of Japanese
population was fixed many years ago with reference to economic, social and soil conditions. Limited
occupational outlets and social pressures encouraged their concentration near their initial points of entry
on the Pacific Coast. That these points may now be near certain strategic military and industrial areas is no
proof of a diabolical purpose on the part of Japanese Americans. See McWilliams, Prejudice, 119-121
(1944); H.R. Rep. No. 2124 (77th Cong., 2d Sess.), 59-93.
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The need for protective custody is also asserted. The report refers without identity
to “numerous incidents of violence” as well as to other admittedly unverified or
cumulative incidents. From this, plus certain other events not shown to have been
connected with the Japanese Americans, it is concluded that the “situation was fraught
with danger to the Japanese population itself” and that the general public “was ready to
take matters into its own hands.”10
Finally, it is intimated, though not directly charged or proved, that persons of
Japanese ancestry were responsible for three minor isolated shellings and bombings of
the Pacific Coast area,11 as well as for unidentified radio transmissions and night
signaling.
The main reasons relied upon by those responsible for the forced evacuation,
therefore, do not prove a reasonable relation between the group characteristics of
Japanese Americans and the dangers of invasion, sabotage and espionage. The reasons
appear, instead, to be largely an accumulation of much of the misinformation, half-truths
and insinuations that for years have been directed against Japanese Americans by people
with racial and economic prejudices—the same people who have been among the
foremost advocates of the evacuation.12 A military judgment based upon such racial
and sociological considerations is not entitled to the great weight ordinarily given the
judgments based upon strictly military considerations. Especially is this so when every
charge relative to race, religion, culture, geographical location, and legal and economic
status has been substantially discredited by independent studies made by experts in
these matters.
The military necessity which is essential to the validity of the evacuation order thus
resolves itself into a few intimations that certain individuals actively aided the enemy,
from which it is inferred that the entire group of Japanese Americans could not be
trusted to be or remain loyal to the United States. No one denies, of course, that there
were some disloyal persons of Japanese descent on the Pacific Coast who did all in their
power to aid their ancestral land. Similar disloyal activities have been engaged in by
10

Final Report, pp. 8-9. This dangerous doctrine of protective custody, as proved by recent European
history, should have absolutely no standing as an excuse for the deprivation of the rights of minority groups.
See H.R. Rep. No. 1911 (77th Cong., 2d Sess.) 1-2. Cf. H.R. Rep. No. 2124 (77th Cong., 2d Sess.) 145-7. In
this instance, moreover, there are only two minor instances of violence on record involving persons of
Japanese ancestry. McWilliams, What About Our Japanese-Americans? 8 (Public Affairs Pamphlets, No. 91,
1944).
11

Final Report, p. 18. One of these incidents (the reputed dropping of incendiary bombs on an Oregon
forest) occurred on Sept. 9, 1942—a considerable time after the Japanese Americans had been evacuated
from their homes and placed in Assembly Centers. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1942, at 1, col. 3.
12

Special interest groups were extremely active in applying pressure for mass evacuation. See H.R. Rep.
No. 2124 (77th Cong., 2d Sess.) 154-6; McWilliams, Prejudice, 126-8 (1944). Mr. Austin E. Anson, managing
secretary of the Salinas Vegetable Grower-Shipper Association, has frankly admitted that “We’re charged
with wanting to get rid of the Japs for selfish reasons . . . . We do. It’s a question of whether the white man
lives on the Pacific Coast or the brown men. They came into this valley to work, and they stayed to
take over . . . . They undersell the white man in the markets . . . . They work their women and children
while the white farmer has to pay wages for his help. If all the Japs were removed tomorrow, we’d never
miss them in two weeks, because the white farmers can take over and produce everything the Jap grows.
And we don’t want them back when the war ends, either.” Quoted by Taylor in his article The People
Nobody Wants, 214 Sat. Eve. Post 24, 66 (May 9, 1942).
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many persons of German, Italian and even more pioneer stock in our country. But to
infer that examples of individual disloyalty prove group disloyalty and justify
discriminatory action against the entire group is to deny that under our system of law
individual guilt is the sole basis for deprivation of rights.
Moreover, this inference, which is at the very heart of the evacuation orders, has
been used in support of the abhorrent and despicable treatment of minority groups by
the dictatorial tyrannies which this nation is now pledged to destroy. To give
constitutional sanction to that inference in this case, however well-intentioned may have
been the military command on the Pacific Coast, is to adopt one of the cruelest of the
rationales used by our enemies to destroy the dignity of the individual and to encourage
and open the door to discriminatory actions against other minority groups in the
passions of tomorrow.
No adequate reason is given for the failure to treat these Japanese Americans on an
individual basis by holding investigations and hearings to separate the loyal from the
disloyal, as was done in the case of persons of German and Italian ancestry. See House
Report No. 2124 (77th Cong., 2d Sess.) 247-52. It is asserted merely that the loyalties of
this group “were unknown and time was of the essence.” Yet nearly four months
elapsed after Pearl Harbor before the first exclusion order was issued; nearly eight
months went by until the last order was issued; and the last of these “subversive”
persons was not actually removed until almost eleven months had elapsed. Leisure and
deliberation seem to have been more of the essence than speed. And the fact that
conditions were not such as to warrant a declaration of martial law adds strength to the
belief that the factors of time and military necessity were not as urgent as they have
been represented to be.
Moreover, there was no adequate proof that the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the military and naval intelligence services did not have the espionage and
sabotage situation well in hand during this long period. Nor is there any denial of the
fact that not one person of Japanese ancestry was accused or convicted of espionage or
sabotage after Pearl Harbor while they were still free,15 a fact which is some evidence
of the loyalty of the vast majority of these individuals and of the effectiveness of the
established methods of combatting these evils. It seems incredible that under these
circumstances it would have been impossible to hold loyalty hearings for the mere
112,000 persons involved—or at least for the 70,000 American citizens—especially when
a large part of this number represented children and elderly men and women.16 Any
inconvenience that may have accompanied an attempt to conform to procedural due
process cannot be said to justify violations of constitutional rights of individuals.
15

The Final Report, p. 34, makes the amazing statement that as of February 14, 1942: “The very fact that
no sabotage has taken place to date is a disturbing and confirming indication that such action will be
taken.” Apparently, in the minds of the military leaders, there was no way that the Japanese Americans
could escape the suspicion of sabotage.
16

During a period of six months, the 112 alien tribunals or hearing boards set up by the British
Government shortly after the outbreak of the present war summoned and examined approximately 74,000
German and Austrian aliens. These tribunals determined whether each individual enemy alien was a real
enemy of the Allies or only a “friendly enemy.” About 64,000 were freed from
internment and from any special restrictions, and only 2,000 were interned. Kempner, The Enemy Alien
Problem in the Present War, 34 A. J. Int’l L. 443, 444-46; H.R. Rep. No. 2124 (77th Cong., 2d Sess.), 280-1.

Appendix B - Optional Student Materials - Korematsu v. United States 1944 Supreme Court
case
8

I dissent, therefore, from this legalization of racism. Racial discrimination in any form
and in any degree has no justifiable part whatever in our democratic way of life. It is
unattractive in any setting but it is utterly revolting among a free people who have
embraced the principles set forth in the Constitution of the United States. All residents
of this nation are kin in some way by blood or culture to a foreign land. Yet they are
primarily and necessarily a part of the new and distinct civilization of the United States.
They must accordingly be treated at all times as the heirs of the American experiment
and as entitled to all the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.
Mr. Justice JACKSON, dissenting.
Korematsu was born on our soil, of parents born in Japan. The Constitution makes
him a citizen of the United States by nativity and a citizen of California by residence.
No claim is made that he is not loyal to this country. * * * Korematsu, however,
has been convicted of an act not commonly a crime. It consists merely of being present
in the state whereof he is a citizen, near the place where he was born, and where all his
life he has lived. * * *
Had Korematsu been one of four—the others being, say, a German alien enemy, an
Italian alien enemy, and a citizen of American-born ancestors, convicted of treason but
out on parole—only Korematsu’s presence would have violated the order. The difference
between their innocence and his crime would result, not from anything he did, said, or
thought, different than they, but only in that he was born of different racial stock.
Now, if any fundamental assumption underlies our system, it is that guilt is personal
and not inheritable. * * * But here is an attempt to make an otherwise innocent act a
crime merely because this prisoner is the son of parents as to whom he had no choice,
and belongs to a race from which there is no way to resign. If Congress in peace-time
legislation should enact such a criminal law, I should suppose this Court would refuse to
enforce it.
But the “law” which this prisoner is convicted of disregarding is not found in an act
of Congress, but in a military order. Neither the Act of Congress nor the Executive Order of
the President, nor both together, would afford a basis for this conviction. It rests on the
orders of General DeWitt. And it is said that if the military commander had reasonable
military grounds for promulgating the orders, they are constitutional and become law,
and the Court is required to enforce them. There are several reasons why I cannot
subscribe to this doctrine.
It would be impracticable and dangerous idealism to expect or insist that each
specific military command in an area of probable operations will conform to conventional
tests of constitutionality. When an area is so beset that it must be put under military
control at all, the paramount consideration is that its measures be successful, rather than
legal. * * * The very essence of the military job is to marshal physical force, to remove
every obstacle to its effectiveness, to give it every strategic advantage. Defense measures
will not, and often should not, be held within the limits that bind civil authority in
peace. No court can require such a commander in such circumstances to act as a
reasonable man; he may be unreasonably cautious and exacting. Perhaps he should be.
But a commander in temporarily focusing the life of a community on defense is carrying
out a military program; he is not making law in the sense the courts know the term. He
issues orders, and they may have a certain authority as military commands, although
they may be very bad as constitutional law.
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But if we cannot confine military expedients by the Constitution, neither would I
distort the Constitution to approve all that the military may deem expedient. That is
what the Court appears to be doing, whether consciously or not. I cannot say, from any
evidence before me, that the orders of General DeWitt were nor reasonably expedient
military precautions, nor could I say that they were. But even if they were permissible
military procedures, I deny that it follows that they are constitutional. If, as the Court
holds, it does follow, then we may as well say that any military order will be
constitutional and have done with it.
The limitation under which courts always will labor in examining the necessity for
a military order are illustrated by this case. How does the Court know that these orders
have a reasonable basis in necessity? No evidence whatever on that subject has been
taken by this or any other court. There is sharp controversy as to the credibility of the
DeWitt report. So the Court, having no real evidence before it, has no choice but to
accept General DeWitt’s own unsworn, self-serving statement, untested by any crossexamination, that what he did was reasonable. And thus it will always be when courts
try to look into the reasonableness of a military order.
In the very nature of things, military decisions are not susceptible of intelligent
judicial appraisal. They do not pretend to rest on evidence, but are made on information
that often would not be admissible and on assumptions that could not be proved.
Information in support of an order could not be disclosed to courts without danger that it
would reach the enemy. Neither can courts act on communications made in confidence.
Hence courts can never have any real alternative to accepting the mere declaration of the
authority that issued the order that it was reasonably necessary from a military
viewpoint.
Much is said of the danger to liberty from the Army program for deporting and
detaining these citizens of Japanese extraction. But a judicial construction of the due
process clause that will sustain this order is a far more subtle blow to liberty than the
promulgation of the order itself. A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to
last longer than the military emergency. Even during that period a succeeding
commander may revoke it all. But once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to
show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show
that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the
principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American
citizens. The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need. Every repetition
imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and thinking and expands it to new
purposes. * * * Nothing better illustrates this danger than does the Court’s opinion in this
case.
It argues that we are bound to uphold the conviction of Korematsu because we
upheld one in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, when we sustained these orders
in so far as they applied a curfew requirement to a citizen of Japanese ancestry. I think
we should learn something from that experience.
In that case we were urged to consider only the curfew feature, that being all that
technically was involved, because it was the only count necessary to sustain
Hirabayashi’s conviction and sentence. We yielded, and the Chief Justice guarded the
opinion as carefully as language will do. * * * “We decide only the issue as we have
defined it—we decide only that the curfew order as applied, and at the time it was
applied, was within the boundaries of the war power.” 320 U.S. 81 at 102. * * *
However, in spite of our limiting words we did validate a discrimination on the basis of
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ancestry for mild and temporary deprivation of liberty. Now the principle of racial
discrimination is pushed from support of mild measures to very harsh ones, and from
temporary deprivations to indeterminate ones. And the precedent which it is said
requires us to do so is Hirabayashi. The Court is now saying that in Hirabayashi we did
decide the very things we there said we were not deciding. Because we said that these
citizens could be made to stay in their homes during the hours of dark, it is said we
must require them to leave home entirely; and if that, we are told they may also be
taken into custody for deportation; and if that, it is argued they may also be held for
some undetermined time in detention camps. How far the principle of this case would be
extended before plausible reasons would play out, I do not know. * * *
My duties as a justice as I see them do not require me to make a military judgment
as to whether General DeWitt’s evacuation and detention program was a reasonable
military necessity. I do not suggest that the courts should have attempted to interfere
with the Army in carrying out its task. But I do not think they may be asked to execute
a military expedient that has no place in law under the Constitution. I would reverse the
judgment and discharge the prisoner.
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